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ORIGINALISM VS. PRECEDENT:
AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
Theodore P. Seto*
Despite repeated attempts to kill it, originalism is flourishing. It
survives, in my view, not because of the superiority of intellectual
arguments in its defense. It survives rather because of its inherent
intuitive appeal. Even nonoriginalists, when advocating a result
defensible by originalist arguments, will almost inevitably make such
arguments.
Originalism is not, of course, unique to constitutional
interpretation. Statutory interpreters use originalist techniques in
construing statutory texts.' In the United States, lower courts profess
to be bound by the text of Supreme Court and other appellate court
opinions, parsing sentences written by recent law graduates as if they
were divine revelation.2 Nor is originalism restricted to law. Islamic
traditionalists insist on the originalist primacy of the Koran and
hadith or sunna;3 Christian Reconstructionists, on the literal text of
the Christian Bible.
4
* Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I want to thank Kurt Lash, Karl
Manheim, and Larry Solum for their thoughtful comments.
1. For an exploration of the relationship between theories of statutory and
constitutional interpretation, see Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (2004).
2. For a discussion of the textualization of precedent, see Peter Tiersma,
The Textualization of Precedent, LOY. L.A. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES,
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-6 (forthcoming 2005) (copy on file
with author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid =
680901.
3. See, e.g., JOHN BURTON, THE SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW: ISLAMIC
THEORIES OF ABROGATION 9-11 (1990); Kent Benedict Gravelle, Islamic Law
in Sudan: A Comparative Analysis, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 1-2 (1998);
YASsIN DUTTON, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1999); Mohammad
Hashim Kamali, Law and Society: The Interplay of Revelation and Reason in
the Shariah, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM 107, 107-10 (John L.
Esposito ed., 1999).
4. See, e.g., ROUSAS JOHN RuSHDOONY, THE INSTITUTES OF BIBLICAL
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The problem of originalism arises in any context in which a
fixed text is deemed authoritative. Once we concede the existence of
an authoritative text, we must necessarily define our relationship to
that text. Originalism is the simplest such relationship: the text and
its original meaning are authoritative, period. No subsequent inter-
pretation or development is comparable in persuasive weight. A
decision-maker may legitimately ignore intervening learning and
explore the text de novo whenever the two conflict. Any credible
alternative to originalism must either deny the authoritativeness of
the text or define some other plausible relationship between the text
and its reader. This is often difficult. Hence originalism's intuitive
appeal.
It is not my purpose here to review the extensive literature on
originalism in American law.5 I propose instead to ask and answer a
question less commonly addressed in that literature: Is there any
reason to believe that originalist interpretive methods will, on
average, produce better or worse rules than nonoriginalist
interpretive methods? I am not asking about legitimacy; originalist
methods may well produce more legitimate outcomes. My focus is
rather on the merits of the resulting rules themselves. A rule requir-
ing a belief that the world was created in seven days,6 a rule
requiring that adulterers be put to death,7 or a rule allowing states to
establish separate public facilities for persons of different races8 may
be "bad" even if legitimate interpretation of some authoritative text
requires it.
LAW 2-4 (1973).
5. For reviews of the statutory originalist literature, see, for example,
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-47
(1994); Carlos E. Gonziles, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L.
REv. 585, 594-634 (1996); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung,
Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of
Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. REv. 803, 804-59 (1994).
For reviews of the constitutional originalist literature, see, for example, RANDY
E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 89-117 (2004); KEITH E. WHrrINGTON, CONSTrrUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEw 18-34 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
6. See Genesis 1:1-2:2 (New Revised Standard).
7. See Leviticus 20:10 (New Revised Standard); RUSHDOONY, supra note
4, at 394, 398-400.
8. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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But how, one may ask, can one postulate any plausible general
criterion for determining whether a given interpretation of the
Constitution, a statute, a Biblical verse, or any other authoritative
text is substantively "good" or "bad"? The approach I take in this
essay is to describe how cultures learn and, on the basis of that
description, assert that such learning is itself adaptive. If cultures
learn and such learning is adaptive, then any decision-making
procedure that systematically ignores such learning is problematic.
Originalism is just such a procedure. By "originalism" I mean
any text-based decision-making technique that permits its user to
ignore intervening learning and rely on some aspect of the original
text-the "intent" of its author(s), its purpose, its public meaning, or
the language of the text itself-whenever the two conflict.
Assuming the text incorporates all relevant cultural learning at the
moment it is issued, in the early days of its interpretation, originalism
should produce decisions incorporating that learning. The more a
culture learns after the text becomes fixed, however, the more
problematic originalism becomes. If the text is amended periodically
to reflect such subsequent learning, the problem is ameliorated-
perhaps even eliminated. In our system of government, however,
even statutes are often hard to amend; indeed, lawmakers rarely
attempt to codify intervening learning on an ongoing basis.9 Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution are generally undertaken only when
intervening learning cannot be reconciled with the existing text using
interpretive techniques other than strict originalism. And most re-
ligious texts are, at least in theory, not subject to amendment at all.
I should note at the outset that my use of the term "originalism"
may not, in some cases, correspond to conventional usage. Applied
at a sufficient level of abstraction, originalism as more con-
ventionally defined may never, in practice, require that we discard
intervening learning. If, for example, we view the Internal Revenue
Code as providing for the taxation of "income," with courts
supplying the details as needed, the exact wording of, say, Code
Section 1001 becomes less interesting.' 0 If we view the Bible as
mandating something like the Golden Rule, we can gracefully ignore
9. Under the U.S. Constitution, statutory amendments must be approved
by three entities: both houses of Congress and the President. A simple
majority vote is not sufficient. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 67-74.
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the details of Leviticus 20:10."1 If we view the Fourteenth
Amendment as merely constitutionalizing an abstract norm of
equality, mid-Nineteenth Century notions of the proper treatment of
women and people of color become irrelevant. At some point,
abstract originalism ceases to be "originalism" for purposes of this
essay. Here, I mean to focus on originalism with real teeth.
I. CULTURAL LEARNING, ON THE WHOLE, IS ADAPTIVE
Cultures learn. In many respects, this is a trivial observation.
Two hundred years ago, we traveled in horse-drawn carriages; today,
we travel by jet. Two hundred years ago, we communicated beyond
voice range by laboriously hand-delivered letter; today, distance
communication is electronic and effectively instantaneous. Two
hundred years ago, bacterial disease killed princes and paupers alike;
today, for the most part, it is a relatively minor threat to public
health.
Some would argue, however, that cultural learning takes place
primarily with respect to material well-being, that the most
fundamental aspects of any culture-its values-remain constant
over time. In his Second Inaugural Address, for example, President
George W. Bush declared that: "Americans move forward in every
generation by reaffirming all that is good and true that came
11. See Leviticus, supra note 7.
12. In American constitutional law, originalist techniques can be applied in
a variety of ways: the interpreter can look at the literal text or the specific
intent of its framers, on the one hand, or at their more general purposes at any
of a variety of levels of abstraction, on the other. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 17-25 (1997). The more
abstract an originalist inquiry, the more likely it can accommodate subsequent
learning, and the less likely it will require a court to discard intervening
learning. As Chemerinsky notes, "[A]t the highest level of abstraction, the
framers desired liberty and equality; almost any imaginable court decision can
be justified as consistent with these values." Id. at 23. I use the term
"originalism" here to refer only to interpretive techniques the use of which
entails a real possibility of discarding intervening learning. My use of the term
encompasses strict textualism, which some view as conceptually different.
See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 683 (1985); Symposium: Texualism
and the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1081 (1998); see also Robert J.
Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A Practitioner's Guide to
Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REv. 451 (2002)
(discussing textualism in statutory interpretation).
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before-ideals of justice and conduct that are the same yesterday,
today, and forever."' 3 In other words, that what is really important
does not change. This simply is not so.
14
Consider, for example, that less than a century and a half ago,
eminent Americans commonly praised genocide as a legitimate tool
of public policy. Oliver Wendell Holmes, father of the U.S.
Supreme Court justice and himself a well-known physician,
commentator, and poet, 15 argued in 1855 that eradication of the
Native American "was the necessary 'solution of the problem of his
relation to the white race."'" 6  In 1876, William Dean Howells,
America's leading literary intellectual, 17 expressed "patriotic pride"
13. George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/0 1/20050120-1.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005).
14. Henry Louis Gates elegantly expresses this point as follows:
History is, in no small part, a chronicle of formerly acceptable
outrages. Once upon a time, perfectly decent folk took it for granted
that watching two gladiators hack each other to death was just the
thing to do on a summer afternoon, that co-religionists with whom you
had teensy doctrinal differences were best roasted on an open fire, that
making slaves of Africans was a good deal for all concerned, and that
participation in politics should be restricted to male landowners. What
were they thinking? You could say that posterity is a hanging judge,
except that sooner or later capital punishment, too, will turn up on that
chronicle of outrages.
Steven R. Manley, The Constitution, the Punishment of Death, and Misguided
"Originalism ", 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 913, 914 (1999) (quoting
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Men Behaving Badly, NEW YORKER, Aug. 18, 1997, at
4).
15. See generally WILLIAM SLOANE KENNEDY, OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, POET, LrTrTRATEUR, SCIENTIST (1976) (describing the accom-
plishments of Oliver Wendell Holmes).
16. DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE
NEW WORLD 244 (1992).
17. See The William Dean Howells Society, About W.D. Howells, at
http://guweb2.gonzaga.edu/faculty/campbell/howells/hbio.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2005). Known during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
as the "Dean of American Letters," William Dean Howells (1837-1920)
served as Assistant Editor, then Editor, of the Atlantic Monthly from 1866 to
1881. Id. His best-known novel is The Rise of Silas Lapham, published in
1885. Id. In 1908, he was elected the first president of the American
Academy of Arts and Letters, now the American Academy and Institute of
Arts and Letters. Id. The Howells Medal for American Fiction is still pre-
sented by the Academy twice a decade for the most distinguished work of
American fiction published during the preceding five years. See American
December 2005] 2005
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in advocating "the extermination of the red savages of the plains.'
8
In 1904, G. Stanley Hall, America's leading psychologist, 19 wrote:
"Never, perhaps, were lower races being extirpated as weeds in the
human garden, both by conscious and organic processes, so rapidly
as to-day.... The world will soon be overcrowded, and we must
begin to take selective agencies into our own hands."20  Soon-to-
become-President Theodore Roosevelt opined that the extermination
of the Native Americans and expropriation of their lands "was as
ultimately beneficial as it was inevitable."21 Adolf Hitler especially
admired the American approach to groups viewed as genetically
inferior and cited it in support of his policies. 22 Today, by contrast,
Americans abhor genocide. It is true, of course, that Americans have
Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters, in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA
84 (Paul Lagassd ed., 6th ed. 2001).
18. STANNARD, supra note 16, at 245.
19. See G. Stanley Hall Lectures, A Brief Biographical Sketch of G. Stanley
Hall, at http://www.ithaca.edu/beins/gsh/gsh bio.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2005). After studying at Harvard under William James, Hall (1844-1924)
established the first psychology laboratory in the United States at Johns
Hopkins. He founded the American Journal of Psychology in 1887, the
Journal of Genetic Psychology in 1891, and the Journal of Applied Psychology
in 1915. In 1892, he was elected the first president of the American
Psychological Association, to which position he was reelected shortly before
his death. He has been characterized as "the great teacher of graduates
students in the first decades of American psychology." DAvID HOTHERSHALL,
HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 296 (2d ed. 1990). As of 1898, he had supervised
thirty of the fifty-four existing American-educated Ph.D.'s in the field. Today,
the American Psychological Association honors Hall with the G. Stanley Hall
Lecture Series. See G. Stanley Hall Lectures, A Brief Biographical Sketch of
G. Stanley Hall, at http://www.ithaca.edu/beins/gsh/gsh-hist.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005).
20. STANNARD, supra note 16, at 245.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 245-46; see EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS
AND AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE 275-76 (2003). In
1924, when Hitler wrote Mein Kampf, he frequently quoted American eugenic
ideology and openly displayed a thorough knowledge of American eugenics
and its phraseology. "'There is today one state,' wrote Hitler, 'in which at
least weak beginnings toward a better conception [of immigration] are
noticeable. Of course, it is not our model German Republic, but the [United
States]."' Id. Hitler proudly told his comrades just how closely he followed
American eugenic legislation. "'I have studied with great interest,"' he told a
fellow Nazi, "'the laws of several American states concerning prevention of
reproduction by people whose progeny would, in all probability, be of no value
or be injurious to the racial stock."' Id.
2006
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always claimed to be bound by the commandment, "Thou shalt not
kill, 23 but our abhorrence of genocide, a deeply held modem value,
is new. It is not an "ideal[] of justice and conduct... the same
yesterday, today and forever."
24
Similarly, less than half a century ago, major American
politicians routinely defended racial segregation and were praised for
doing so. In 2001, Senator Trent Lott gave a speech celebrating a
former segregationist's career, echoing that praise: "I want to say this
about my state. When Strom Thurmond ran for president, we voted
for him. We're proud of it. And if the rest of the country had
followed our lead, we wouldn't have had all these problems over all
these years either." 25 American attitudes had changed so profoundly
in the interim that public outrage forced Senator Lott to resign as
26Senate Majority Leader. 6 This year, under a conservative U.S.
president, an African-American woman succeeds an African-
American man as Secretary of State.27 Again, most Americans have
always claimed to believe that "all men are created equal."28 Our
generally accepted implementation of this norm, however, has only
recently come routinely to include people of other races-again, a
profound change in values.
Of course, the fact that fundamental behaviors change over time
does not necessarily mean they change for the better. In the United
States, the past half-century has witnessed both the Warren Court's
expansion of the rights of criminal defendants and a partial reversal
of that expansion by subsequent Courts.29 Attitudes towards pre-
23. Exodus 20:13 (King James).
24. Bush, supra note 13.
25. See Adam Clymar, Divisive Words: The Downfall; 30-Year Dream of
Leadership Is Undone by a Lack ofAllies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at Al 9.
26. See Nick Anderson, Lott Resigns His Post as Senate GOP Leader, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at Al.
27. See Richard B. Schmitt & Tyler Marshall, Rice Is Confirmed Despite
Opposition, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A24.
28. American Declaration of Independence (1776), reprinted in IV THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEMOCRACY 1432 (Seymour Martin Lipset ed., 1995).
29. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO.
L.J. 185 (1983); Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedural
Reform, and Retributive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1411 (2002);
Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the
Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L.
REv. 1361 (2004); Stephen F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal
2007
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marital sex have become far more permissive.30 Women spend less
time raising children, more time in the workplace. 31 The Rehnquist
Court has proclaimed a robust new federalism. 32 I do not mean to
endorse or condemn any of these changes. My point is simply that
the mere fact they have occurred does not necessarily mean they are
good. How then can we conclude that, on the whole, cultural
learning is adaptive and should be valued?
A. What is Evolution?
The model I propose to use to explore this question is based on
evolutionary theory. The concept of evolution I invoke is un-
familiar to some; I therefore begin by outlining the concept itself.
Evolution, as I use the term, has nothing inherently to do with
biology or the origins of life. It is simply a probabilistic process that
changes the characteristics of populations of a wide variety of
phenomena in predictable ways over time-what science sometimes
calls "selection." In Part I, I argue that a culture's learned behaviors
are subject to this process; in Part II, that American judicial decisions
are subject to the same process.
How does evolution work? Imagine the following game played
with a bag of marbles. Initially, the marbles are a variety of colors,
Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1337 (2002); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 435 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvar6, Saying "Yes" Before Saying "I Do":
Premarital Sex and Cohabitation as a Piece of the Divorce Puzzle, 18 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7 (2004).
31. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78
N.C. L. REv. 707 (2000); Pamela J. Smith, Part I-Romantic Paternalism-
The Ties That Bind Also Free: Revealing the Contours of Judicial Affinity for
White Women, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 107, 122-29 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74
TEX. L. REv. 795 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570 (2003)
("[T]he dominant theme of the second Rehnquist Court has been constitutional
federalism, including the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth Amendment limitations on
federal power, and state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits reflected in
the Eleventh Amendment.").
33. Aspects of this model are outlined in Theodore P. Seto, Intergene-
rational Decision Making: An Evolutionary Perspective, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
235 (2001).
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randomly selected. At each turn, two things happen. First, half the
marbles are taken out of the bag. For evolution to operate, the
probability that a particular marble will be removed depends on one
or more criteria external to the marbles themselves. Assume, for
example, that the darker the marble, the more likely it will stay in;
the lighter, the more likely it will be taken out. The second thing that
happens is that the marbles remaining in the bag replicate
themselves-each produces a second, identical marble. As a result,
at the end of the turn the bag holds the same number of marbles it
started with. But the average marble at the end of the turn is likely to
be darker than the average marble at the beginning of the turn.
Given a large enough bag, this should be true even if the probability
of a light marble being removed is only slightly larger than the
probability of a dark marble being removed. Now assume the
procedure is repeated again and again. Eventually, with a probability
approaching one hundred percent, the average marble in the bag will
be very dark.
This is evolution in operation. Staying in the bag is equivalent
to survival. Our marbles are, in effect, surviving and reproducing
differentially in response to environmental conditions-in this case,
a preference for dark marbles. The net effect is to produce a final
population of marbles quite different from that with which we began.
The process will work even if all the marbles in the bag are initially
white, provided that we add one additional factor: imperfect
reproduction. Assume that when the marbles remaining in the bag
replicate themselves they almost always-but not always-produce
marbles of identical color. On occasion they mutate, randomly
generating offspring of some slightly darker or lighter color. With
this additional factor, even if we start with marbles that are
completely white, evolution will still eventually produce a bag of
dark marbles.
We most commonly apply evolutionary theory to explain
genetic change. As a matter of logic, however, the process itself
applies to any phenomena that meet three criteria: (1) such
phenomena survive or reproduce differentially in response to a
common set of environmental conditions; (2) they reproduce
imperfectly; and (3) adaptive imperfections in their reproduction are
December 2005] 2009
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not systematically disfavored. 4 If these three criteria are met and
environmental conditions are relatively stable, logic tells us that over
time such phenomena will, with a probability approaching certainty,
become better adapted to the environmental conditions they face.
This is the law of evolution.
35
B. Learned Behaviors Evolve
Some behaviors are triggered by genetically-controlled
mechanisms. Ants forage. Bees dance. Opossums play dead.
Beavers build. We call such behaviors "instinctive." They are trans-
mitted genetically, which means that a change in such behaviors
requires genetic change. In humans, the beating of our heart,
breathing, and suckling all appear to be triggered by genetically
controlled mechanisms. Humans differ from most other species,
however, in that most of our behaviors are, at least to some extent,
learned. By "learned behaviors" I mean simply behaviors that can be
transmitted other than genetically. Importantly, such behaviors can
change without the requirement of any genetic change.
Evolutionary theorists are still struggling with the problem of
how to think about learned behaviors. Biologist Richard Dawkins
suggested one approach in 1976. In an afterthought at the end of a
book on genes, he suggested that evolution might also apply to
"memes," which he defined alternatively as units of cultural
transmission or units of imitation.36 Others have picked up on his
suggestion.37 Unfortunately, it remains unclear what a "meme" is.
38
34. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVOLUTION 798-99 (Mark Pagel ed., 2002).
35. This is a generalized nonmathematical restatement of Fischer's Fund-
amental Theorem of Natural Selection. See 1 id. at 371-72; DANMEL L. HARTL,
A PRIMER OF POPULATION GENETICS 244-45 (2d ed. 1988). For purposes of
this definition and law, an "environmental condition" is a condition external to
the phenomena in question that affects their survival or reproduction; it is
"relatively stable" if it does not change as fast as evolution operates; a
characteristic is "adaptive" if such phenomena are more likely to survive and
reproduce successfully with that characteristic than without it; and phenomena
are said to become "better adapted" to the environmental conditions they face
if an increasing portion of the population of such phenomena has adaptive
characteristics.
36. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 192 (1976).
37. See, e.g., SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999); RICHARD
BRODIE, VIRUS OF THE MIND: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MEME (1996);
DANIEL DENNETr, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991); DANIEL DEN ETr,
DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA (1995); AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT CONTAGION:
2010
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Most commonly, the term refers to an undefined set, of which "idea"
is one of the principal subsets. Some imply that virtually everything
we know is a meme. Others limit the term to ideas or behaviors
acquired solely by transmission from others. 39 I use the term to refer
to any non-genetic internal mechanism that motivates behavior.4 °
Ideas motivate behaviors; ideas are therefore memes. Other non-
genetic motivators may exist as well.
I do not propose to focus on memes; I propose instead to focus
on the learned behaviors themselves. 4 1 We often think of behaviors
separately from the humans who undertake them. I read, so do you.
We both carry the learned behavior of reading. Hopefully, I will
transmit this behavior to my children. At some point, I may cease to
carry the behavior. But the behavior will almost certainly persist in
others. As long as someone carries it, the behavior will continue to
exist.
For analytic purposes, it is useful to make this separation
complete, to think of learned behaviors as entities completely
independent of the individuals who carry them, almost like
bacteria-some beneficial, some not-that get their start in one or
more individuals and then spread across the population. Consider,
How BELIEF SPREADS THROUGH SOCIETY (1996). See generally 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EvOLUTION 713-16 (2002) (discussing the "meme").
38. Some other attempted definitions of "meme" include: (1) an element of
culture transmitted non-genetically; (2) "a contagious information pattern that
replicates by parasitically infecting human minds and altering their behavior,
causing them to propagate the pattern"; (3) "a unit of information residing in
the brain"; (4) "whatever it is that is passed on by imitation"; (5) "a unit of
cultural inheritance" analogous to the gene, "naturally selected by virtue of its
'phenotypic' consequences." LEE ALAN DUGATKIN, THE IMITATION FACTOR:
EVOLUTION BEYOND THE GENE 117 (2000).
39. See, e.g., BLACKMORE, supra note 37, at 45.
40. To use a biological analogy, the "meme" is the genotype of which the
learned behavior is the phenotype. My definition is thus closest to the
definition favored by Dugatkin. See DUGATKIN, supra note 38, at 118.
Discussion of the relationship between genetic and non-genetic motivators is
beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that thirst itself appears to be
genetically programmed; a desire for Coca-Cola, by contrast, is memetic.
41. I focus on learned behaviors rather than memes for several reasons: (1)
for the most part, behaviors, not memes, determine whether we survive and
reproduce; (2) we know a lot about behaviors, very little about memes; (3)
behaviors are observable and measurable; and (4) a focus on behaviors tends to
reduce the importance of the nature/nurture problem, since behaviors evolve
regardless of whether they are learned or genetic.
December 2005] 2011
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for example, the learned behavior of using a telephone. It originated
with Alexander Graham Bell and has since infected most of the U.S.
population. Children are not born with the behavior but, at least in
the United States, very quickly receive it from others. Thus far it has
proved highly successful at surviving and reproducing. By contrast,
consider the learned behavior of playing what Americans call
"Russian roulette," a game in which the player loads one bullet into a
revolver, spins the chamber randomly, points the gun at his own
brain, and pulls the trigger. If the gun fires, he loses. He also, of
course, dies. This learned behavior has not spread widely; it tends to
kill individuals who carry it before they can transmit it to others, thus
making further infection less likely.
So characterized, it becomes plausible to analyze learned
behaviors much as we would bacteria, exploring their survival
strategies and evaluating their relative evolutionary success or
failure. Indeed, so conceived, learned behaviors meet all three
criteria for application of the law of evolution. First, they survive or
reproduce differentially in response to environmental conditions.
One of the avowed purposes of law is to influence the survival and
reproduction of learned behaviors by shaping the environmental
conditions their human carriers face; law often seeks to extinguish
some learned behaviors and encourage others. Second, the repro-
duction of learned behaviors is imperfect, as any parent or teacher
will attest. And third, there is no evidence that adaptive imper-
fections are systematically disfavored. In other words, learned
behaviors evolve.
C. The Capacity to Carry Learned Behaviors is Adaptive
Human beings make extraordinary evolutionary sacrifices to
carry learned behaviors. We are born with enormous heads that
sometimes kill our mothers in childbirth. The young of other
mammals can commonly walk and perform other routine survival
tasks independently immediately upon birth. We, by contrast, take
years to learn how to perform all but the most primitive acts,
consuming major amounts of parental resources in the meantime.
Infantile helplessness and the consequent demand on parental
resources obviously cannot be adaptive for their own sake; they must
lead to some major evolutionary payoff. Otherwise, we would
expect them to be washed out of the gene pool. Why do we make
2012
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these sacrifices?
The answer is that the power of evolution depends on its speed.
Evolution, recall, is a probabilistic process through which phe-
nomena (ourselves included) adapt to environmental challenges. The
faster a population can adapt, the more likely it is to survive and
flourish. Because genetic change is not a prerequisite for changes in
and transmission of learned behaviors, learned behaviors can evolve
orders of magnitude more quickly than instinctive behaviors. This
means, in turn, that organisms whose behaviors are learned can adapt
far more quickly (and, ultimately, in far more complex ways) to
environmental challenges than organisms whose behaviors are
genetically-determined and who must therefore wait for the evolution
of new DNA to encode new behaviors. Humans dominate Earth
because our behaviors evolve more quickly than those of any other
species. The sacrifices we make to enable ourselves to carry learned
behaviors appear thus far to have paid off spectacularly.
D. How Cultures Learn
We are now ready to describe cultural learning. What does it
mean to say that a culture has "learned" a particular behavior? It
means simply that the learned behavior in question has spread across
the culture to the point that it dominates competing behaviors.
Complex dynamics may have been involved in causing the behavior
to spread, but in declaring that a culture has "learned" a behavior, all
we are really doing is counting instances of that behavior and
comparing its success to that of its competitors. For a behavior to be
"learned," there is no requirement that anyone in the culture choose
it, understand it, or even be conscious of it. No one ever designed or
chose a Congress that behaves the way our current Congress
behaves. No one envisioned the complex of behaviors that com-
prises the Internet. We did not convene one day and vote to
revolutionize sexual mores. Nor does anyone fully understand any
of these phenomena. Each, nevertheless, reflects cultural learning.
Reason is profoundly important to our success as a species, but
its role is commonly misunderstood. The function of reason is not to
decide how we should behave; evolution ultimately determines the
fate of all learned behaviors, rational or irrational. The function of
reason is rather to accelerate the evolutionary process.
An example may usefully illustrate this point. Assume a
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population, half of which is careful when crossing the street; the
other half, inattentive. Assume in addition that individuals who are
careful are more likely to survive and transmit their behavior to
others than inattentive individuals. What will happen to this popu-
lation over time? Evolutionary theory tells us that individuals who
are careful when crossing the street will likely comprise an
increasingly large portion of the population as a whole.42 This is true
regardless of whether the population in question consists of humans
or squirrels. Given enough time and a stable set of environmental
conditions, the populations of both should become dominated by
careful street crossers. Reason is not necessary to the process at all.
Yet we know that squirrels are not, for the most part, careful
street crossers while humans are, at least in cultures that have used
cars for a while. Why the difference? In a human society to which
vehicles have just been introduced, reason makes the initial
development of careful behaviors far more likely. "Oh! That person
was just hit by a car. Perhaps I should be careful when crossing the
street." It also facilitates transmission of the resulting careful
behaviors. "Remember, look both ways before you cross."
Evolution of the same careful behaviors in squirrels requires genetic
innovation and transmission, which generally take much longer.
Given thousands, perhaps millions, of generations, squirrels should
eventually become street smart. Humans, however, typically acquire
this trait in less than a generation. This is the special advantage of
reason: it facilitates the evolution of learned behaviors. Reason may
predict, but does not determine, evolution's course. If its predictions
are correct, it accelerates the evolutionary process; if they are
incorrect, sooner or later they fall to experience.
Some forty-five years ago, economist/philosopher Friedrich
Hayek explored the respective roles of reason and evolution in the
42. The percentage that remains inattentive will not necessarily decline to
zero, for at least two reasons. First, transmission may not be perfect. A careful
parent may produce an inattentive child or a careful teacher an inattentive
pupil. Second, the system will likely contain some amount of "noise"--good
and bad things happening to both careful and inattentive individuals for
reasons having nothing to do with their care or inattention. If there is sufficient
noise-that is, if enough good or bad things happen randomly to both groups-
some portion of the population as a whole may remain inattentive even if
transmission is perfect, despite the fact that inattention is less adaptive than
care.
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development of culture. He asserted, in effect, that we should view
culture as the product of evolutionary processes operating on learned
behaviors-although he referred instead to the evolution of
"institutions," "tools," "practices," and "rules:"
43
While the rationalist tradition assumes that man was
originally endowed with both the intellectual and the moral
attributes that enabled him to fashion civilization
deliberately, the evolutionists made it clear that civilization
was the accumulated hard-earned result of trial and error;
that it was the sum of experience, in part handed from
generation to generation as explicit knowledge, but to a
larger extent embodied in tools and institutions which had
proved themselves superior-institutions whose sig-
nificance we might discover by analysis but which will also
serve men's ends without men's understanding them.
44
It is the accumulation of transmitted learned behaviors over
centuries-indeed, millennia-that makes civilization possible. We
do not, through the exercise of reason, rediscover the essential
attributes of our culture from scratch each generation; we learn them
from our forbearers, adding to them only incrementally. As Hayek
stated, "[man] is successful not because he knows why he ought to
observe the rules which he does observe, or is even capable of stating
all these rules in words, but because his thinking and acting are
governed by rules which have by a process of selection been evolved
in the society in which he lives, and which are thus the product of the
experience of generations.
'A5
E. The Adaptivity of Cultural Learning
This brings us to the core question: is there any reason to believe
that, on the whole, cultural learning is adaptive and should be
43. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54-70
(1960) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY]; 1 FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 8-34 (1973)
[hereinafter HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER]. "The cultural heritage into which
man is born consists of a complex of practices or rules of conduct which have
prevailed because they made a group of men successful but which were not
adopted because it was known that they would bring about desired effects." Id.
at 17.
44. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 43, at 59-60.
45. See HAYEK, RULES AND ORDER, supra note 43, at 11.
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valued? We know that the very essence of the human evolutionary
strategy is to make cultural learning possible.46 We know that this
strategy has been spectacularly successful. Is there really any
question?
Here, evolutionary theory offers two important cautions. First,
behaviors, like genes or bacteria, are evolutionarily successful if they
survive and reproduce. Although generally helpful, it is not
necessary that their human carriers also thrive. An obvious example
is the vow of chastity, which, if actually observed, prevents its
human carriers from reproducing altogether. Of course, such a
pronounced effect makes it unlikely the behavior will become
widespread. The Shakers insisted that all adherents practice celi-
bacy; not surprisingly, for all its virtues, Shakerism has gone
completely extinct.
47
More commonly, this means that behaviors may persist despite a
modest negative effect on their human hosts or, indeed, no effect at
all. When a learned behavior persists, we need to ask whether it does
so because it actually helps its human carriers adapt effectively to the
challenges they face or rather because some characteristic makes the
behavior likely to persist despite its effect (or lack of effect) on
human carriers. For example, texts tend to survive, spread their hold
across human populations, and resist change far more effectively
than non-textual competitors. They do so because they are more
easily reproduced and transmitted without corruption, not necessarily
because the behaviors they prescribe are better for their human
carriers. I return to this aspect of texts in Part III below.
A second reason that a given change in values may not actually
be good for its human carriers is that evolution is inherently a
process of experimentation. Some experiments fail. Our culture is
already well adapted to most of the challenges we face. Minor
maladaptive effects, therefore, are not likely to have any perceptible
effect on individual success in the short run. Expanded tolerance for
premarital sex, for example, may ultimately prove to have been an
interesting experiment that failed. If so, it should eventually come to
be carried by a diminishing portion of our population. Or such
tolerance may, in some form, make its human carriers more adaptive.
46. See supra Part I.C.
47. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 17, at 2579.
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If so, in the long run evolutionary theory predicts that it will become
a permanent part of our culture. The fact that it exists today,
however, tells us little about how the experiment will ultimately turn
out.
Notwithstanding either of these caveats, evolutionary theory
strongly supports the conclusion that, on the whole, cultural learning
is adaptive--indeed, that it is at the core of the human evolutionary
strategy. We should therefore be able to frame accounts of our most
important modem values-rule of law, equality, democracy, and
liberty, among others-in terms of their adaptivity. Some are un-
doubtedly responses to the single most deadly challenge humans
face: other humans. We know that members of cultures with less
internal violence prosper dramatically better, on average, than
members of internally violent ones. Behaviors and associated
memes that reduce intra and inter-group conflict-democratic
decision-making, racial equality, rule of law, and aversion to
genocide, among others-should therefore be strongly adaptive.
Liberty and a tolerance of behavioral diversity, on the other hand,
allow behaviors to evolve more quickly. Because the speed at which
evolution operates determines its power, they too should be adaptive.
Full discussion of these issues is well beyond the scope of this essay.
My point here is rather that the adaptivity of cultural learning is not
merely an abstract advantage; it relates directly to the core of the
legal enterprise.
In sum, although we cannot be certain that specific experiments
will always be successful, evolutionary theory nevertheless allows us
to conclude with confidence that cultural learning is, on the whole,
adaptive to us as humans.
II. ORIGINALISM LEGITIMIZES REJECTION OF
CULTURAL LEARNING SUBSEQUENT TO THE TEXT
I have defined "originalism" to include any decision-making
technique based on an authoritative text that permits its user to
ignore intervening learning and rely on some aspect of the original
text whenever the two conflict. If cultural learning is adaptive, the
more a culture learns after the text becomes fixed, the more
problematic originalism becomes.
In American law, the issue pits originalism against precedent.
At a 2005 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) conference
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to be published in Constitutional Commentary, Professors Randy
Barnett and Akhil Amar took the position that, in general, in the
event of a conflict between the original public meaning of the U.S.
Constitution, on the one hand, and subsequent precedent, on the
other, judges should discard the precedent. 48  Professors David
Strauss and Thomas Merrill, for the most part, disagreed. 49 To locate
this essay within that debate, I need first to define the evolutionary
role of precedent.
Recall that, as a matter of logic, evolutionary processes operate
on any phenomena that meet three criteria: (1) such phenomena
survive or reproduce differentially in response to a common set of
environmental conditions; (2) they reproduce imperfectly; and
(3) adaptive imperfections in their reproduction are not system-
atically disfavored. In the common law tradition, judicial decisions
constitute precedent. What this means is that judges feel obligated,
when issues recur, to reproduce the rationale and result of earlier
decisions addressing the same issues. In other words, because judges
are supposed to follow precedent, American case law reproduces
itself.5  Such reproduction is clearly imperfect, and there is no
reason to believe that adaptive imperfections are systematically
disfavored, so the second and third criteria for evolution are met. It
follows that if the first criterion is met-if lines of cases survive and
reproduce differentially in response to a common set of enviro-
nmental conditions-then case law must evolve.
Clearly, lines of cases survive and reproduce differentially, some
48. Amar advocates, most importantly, an exception for precedent "rat-
ified" by public acceptance. See infra pp. 2020-2021.
49. Posting of Lawrence Solum, lsolum@sandiego.edu, Legal Theory Blog,
Blogging from San Francisco: Precedent and Originalism, at http://lsolum.
blogspot.com/archives/2005_01 01 lsolumarchive.html (Jan. 8, 2005) (rep-
orting AALS Conference Session).
50. See generally Mei-Fei Kuo & Kai Wang, When Is an Innovation in
Order?: Justice Bader Ruth Ginsberg and Stare Decisis, 20 U. HAW. L. REv.
835 (1998) (stating that the Supreme Court preserves legal consistency by
adhering to well-established precedent). Whether law is subject to a similar
dynamic in civil law systems is a fascinating question, but beyond the scope of
this essay. See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil
Law, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 333 (1999) (contrasting theory and practice in the
common law and civil law systems); Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of
Decision: The Common Law's Advantage Over the Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 87 (1998) (same); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global
Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003).
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more successfully than others. Some die out altogether. We do not
fully understand the environmental conditions that affect this
differential success. In our less trusting moments, we worry that the
social class or politics of the judges may play an undue role. I do not
deny this possibility. All else being equal, however, I submit that
judges of all classes and politics tend to favor rules they believe will
help humanity survive and reproduce, and to disfavor rules they
believe will not-in other words, to favor adaptive rules and disfavor
maladaptive ones. Their judgments in this regard may, of course, be
erroneous and will undoubtedly be colored by personal experiences,
backgrounds, and attitudes. Nevertheless, if my premise is correct,
then over time, with a probability approaching certainty, case law
should become increasingly adaptive to us as humans.
In effect, case law collects and reflects a particular type of
cultural learning-learning with regard to the legally enforceable
rules most likely to make our culture adaptive at the individual level.
Brown v. Board of Education5' replaces Plessy v. Ferguson.52 The
Rule of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders is abandoned as
obsolete.53 Comparative negligence replaces contributory negli-
gence.5 4 Punitive damage awards are limited." Miranda warnings
become mandatory. 56 In short, the law evolves.
But if this is so, then any rule that permits a court to disregard
intervening case law and return to the state of societal thinking one
hundred, two hundred, or two thousand years ago is unlikely, on the
whole, to be adaptive. It is unlikely to help humans flourish. Human
flourishing may not be the be-all or end-all but, all other things being
51. 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53. See T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 513, 530-34 (2003); Patricia J. Roberts, The Acceleration ofRemainders:
Manipulating the Identity of the Remaindermen, 42 S.C. L. REV. 295, 311-13
(1991).
54. See Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Neg-
ligence, and Stare Decisis in North Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 3
(1996); Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or
Comparative: Which Is the Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
41,43 (2003).
55. See Bridget E. Leonard, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell: Refining BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and Further
Restricting Punitive Damages, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 545 (2004).
56. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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equal, we should prefer it. Insistence on a mode of statutory,
constitutional, or any other kind of interpretation that systematically
rejects intervening cultural learning seems hard to defend.
The problem is not remedied by originalist arguments, however
brilliant, that the possibility of subsequent learning was in fact
anticipated in the authoritative text-that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for example, meant to leave open the
possibility of imposing the Bill of Rights on the states,57 requiring
racially integrated public schools,
58 and protecting women's rights.5
9
As long as reasonable originalist arguments to the contrary exist,
endorsement of originalism as a rule of decision legitimizes the
possible rejection of such subsequent learning.
Nor is the problem likely to be solved by a robust theory of
ratification, which in effect makes a text easier to amend. In the
Constitutional context, for example, Akhil Amar has argued that
"[w]hen the citizenry has widely and enthusiastically embraced an
erroneous precedent, when even most initial skeptics have deemed it
fundamental and admirable, it is sensible-and consistent with the
document's emphasis on popular sovereignty-to view this
precedent as sufficiently ratified by the American People so as to
insulate it from judicial overruling."60 Brown v. Board of Education,
he has asserted, is saved on this theory and therefore should not be
57. For a review of the literature on this issue, see Bryan H. Wildenthal,
The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and
Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051 (2000).
58. For reviews and samples of the literature on this issue, see, for example,
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REv. 1881 (1995); William H.
Manz, Brown v. Board of Education: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 96
LAW LIBR. J. 245 (2004); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Deseg-
regation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995); Michael J. Perry, Brown,
Bolling, & Originalism: Why Ackerman and Posner (Among Others) Are
Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53 (1995); Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Can-
onized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 383 (2000); Ronald
Turner, Was "Separate but Equal" Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and
Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & Cry. RTS. L. REv. 229 (1995).
59. For a review of the literature on this issue, see Ward Farnsworth,
Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding, 94 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1229 (2000).
60. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REv. 26, 85 (2000).
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overturned on originalist grounds. In my view, Amar's theory is
useful primarily in that it illustrates the difficulties of this approach
to solving the originalist problem. First, few judicial decisions ever
themselves become visible enough to permit plausible popular
ratification arguments. How many non-lawyers, for example, have
ever heard of Griswold v. Connecticut?61  Second, to maintain
consistency with his own arguments for originalism, Amar must set a
high threshold for deemed ratification: "Although the counterfactual
cannot be proved with absolute certainty, if Brown were not already
on the books, wouldn't We the People have explicitly inscribed its
basic rule in the document alongside the other inclusionary
amendments of the late twentieth century?"' 62  Such a standard,
realistically applied, can save only a very small portion of the
cultural learning embodied in judicial precedent. Third and most
importantly, Amar's approach only saves old precedent; it does not
authorize the incorporation of future cultural learning into future
cases. If Amar's theory were to become widely adopted, courts
would never decide the next Brown. Indeed, had Amar's approach
effectively controlled judicial decision making in 1954, there is a real
possibility that American public schools would still be racially
segregated.
III. IS STRICT ADHERENCE TO AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS ADAPTIVE?
There remains the possibility that strict adherence to
authoritative texts is itself either adaptive or required for reasons
irrelevant to adaptivity. If so, the maladaptivity of originalism may
be outweighed by such other considerations. Why do we or should
we give such dominant status to texts?
A first possibility explains why we do, but not why we should.
As I have already noted, a cluster of learned behaviors and associated
memes will be evolutionarily successful if it survives and
reproduces. Learned behaviors tend to be more evolutionary
successful if they help their carriers thrive, but this is not strictly
necessary. When any cluster of learned behaviors and associated
memes persists, we need to ask whether it does so because it actually
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes on a person's right to marital
privacy).
62. Amar, supra note 60, at 85-86.
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helps its carriers or whether some other characteristic makes it likely
to persist despite a negative or neutral effect on its human carriers. I
have also noted that, because they are more easily reproduced and
transmitted without corruption, texts tend to survive, spread their
hold across human populations, and resist change far more
effectively than non-textual competitors. In other words, the fact that
an authoritative text is a text makes it per se more likely to survive,
regardless of whether the behaviors it prescribes are adaptive to their
human carriers. This may explain why we respect the written word,
but it does nothing to justify discarding intervening learning.
A second possibility is that adherence to a particular text is
required because it is inherently authoritative. Religious texts claim
such authority. One must read, believe, and follow the Christian
Bible, Christians assert, because it is the word of God, period. God
knows all. We therefore need not worry about subsequent cultural
learning; the text already contains all possibly relevant learning.
And, some might add, since God loves us, the text is necessarily
adaptive. Legal originalists sometimes make similar claims: we must
adhere to the literal word of the statute or the Constitution because it
is the word of the People, period. Judges (being unelected, or at least
some of them) do not speak for the People. Precedent, being merely
the word of judges, should be ignored whenever it conflicts.
It is not my purpose here to evaluate the claims of Christianity
or any other religion. Evolutionary theory predicts, however, that if
the Bible does not incorporate all possible moral learning, the
problem of originalism should become more acute as the Bible ages.
Specifically, we should find modem Christians ignoring parts of the
Bible that conflict with intervening cultural learning. And we do.
The Bible clearly requires that adulterers be put to death;63 most
Christians ignore this. The Bible prohibits lending money for
interest.64 Christians observed this commandment for a millennium
and a half; they ignore it today.65 An honest reading of the Bible
reveals countless further examples. 66  But if intervening cultural
63. Leviticus 20:10 (New Revised Standard).
64. Deuteronomy 23:19 (New Revised Standard).
65. See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth In Lending Act, 55 FLA.
L. REv. 807 (2003).
66. See generally RUSHDOONY, supra note 4 (examining a variety of "fun-
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learning allows us to ignore the word of God, why should the word
of the People command stricter adherence?
Ultimately, therefore, legal originalists must justify their
position instead on instrumental grounds-in evolutionary terms, on
the ground that adhering to specific authoritative texts is adaptive. In
the case of statutes, which is an easier context, these instrumental
arguments fall into two broad categories. First, decisions will be
more legitimate, thereby reducing potential intra-group conflict, if
they are made by representatives elected by the people-or, in the
case of direct democracy, by the people themselves. This is, I should
point out, an empirically testable but untested claim. I know of no
studies supporting the premise that intra-group conflict is lower
when judges adhere systematically to originalist norms.
A second class of argument focuses on institutional competence:
legislatures are better able to bring all relevant expertise to bear on
any given issue; judges, sitting in solitary splendor in their chambers,
lack such competence and should therefore limit the factors they
consider to those considered by the enacting legislature. There are at
least two problems with this class of argument. First, the factual
predicate is questionable; judges often have far more experience with
the problem of applying a given set of rules to the real world than the
legislature that enacted those rules. If so, it should be adaptive for
them to incorporate that experience into their decision making.
Second, this class of argument simply does not address the problem
of intervening learning. Even if the legislature considered all
existing learning at the time of enactment, it has no superior
institutional competence with respect to subsequent cultural learning.
An example may usefully illustrate some of these issues. In the
U.S. income tax system, taxpayers are generally taxed on income,
including gain from the sale of property. Section 1001(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code defines gain as the amount by which a
taxpayer's "amount realized" exceeds her "adjusted basis."
67
"Amount realized," in turn, is defined in Section 1001(b) as "the sum
of any money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received. 68 In other words, when a taxpayer
sells property, the statute directs her to perform an arithmetic
damental" biblical principles that are often ignored).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
68. Id. § 1001(b).
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operation-add the cash she got to the fair market value of any
property she got and subtract her "adjusted basis" (roughly, her cost
adjusted by a variety of factors)-and report the difference on her tax
return. This definition of "amount realized" first appeared in the
Revenue Act of 1924 and has been carried forward verbatim ever
since.
But what if seller receives something other than cash or property
as consideration for the property being sold? Assume, for example,
that the property is subject to an assignable non-recourse mortgage.
Say the property is worth $100,000 and is subject to an $80,000
mortgage. Taxpayer sells the property for $20,000 in cash subject to
that mortgage. In other words, buyer pays $20,000 for taxpayer's net
equity interest in the property. What is seller's "amount realized"?
Her cash received is $20,000. She receives no property other than
cash. If she reads the statute literally, her "amount realized" must be
$20,000. In Crane v. Commissioner, decided in 1947, the Supreme
Court held instead that her "amount realized" should also include the
amount of the debt to which the property was subject.69 In other
words, in our hypothetical, the taxpayer's "amount realized" should
be $100,000. In subsequent cases and rulings, "amount realized" has
also been held to include the value of (1) services received or
promised,70 (2) the use of property, 71 (3) a franchise extension,72 and
(4) the release of marital rights,73 none of which appear to be
encompassed by the statutory language, read literally.
What has happened is that courts, in the course of repeated
encounters with the statutory language in question, have concluded
that that language, although duly enacted by Congress, often does not
in fact measure taxpayers' incomes correctly. In consequence, courts
have effectively rewritten the statute to define "amount realized" as
"the sum of [any money] received plus the fair market value of [any
economic benefit (other than money) received]. 74 This rewriting
reflects three-quarters of a century of accumulated learning on the
69. 331 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1947).
70. Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943).
71. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (1979).
72. Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct.
Cl. 1954).
73. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72-73 (1962).
74. James Edward Maule, Gross Income: Overview and Conceptual
Aspects, 501-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-145 (May 19, 2003).
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question. It is easy enough to construct originalist arguments in
support of the change. At the same time, an honest plain language
originalist would probably have to reject the change and insist that
Congress correct its own sloppy drafting or live with the
consequences. Standard instrumental justifications for doing so
seem thin indeed.
Might originalism be more instrumentally defensible in the
constitutional context? Note the nature of the question. I am no
longer asking whether the authorship of the Constitution by the
People requires originalism. I am asking rather whether there is
something in the nature of constitutionalism that makes the
systematic discarding of intervening learning about constitutional, as
opposed to statutory, issues adaptive. The problem of constitutional
interpretation is the subject of massive literature, a review of which
is beyond the scope of this essay. I would, however, make two
points that I believe to be new.
First, given the general adaptivity of cultural learning, a heavy
burden should rest on originalists to justify adoption of a decision-
making technique that legitimates systematic discarding of such
learning-particularly with regard to the most fundamental legal
issues we face: rule of law, equality, liberty, and the like. We
humans have made profound evolutionary sacrifices to make cultural
learning possible. The strategy seems to have worked. Advocates of
a change in this strategy should be required to put forth compelling
reasons for such a change. "In the constitutional context," origin-
alists effectively claim, "the core human strategy, which has served
us spectacularly well throughout our history, doesn't work and
should be abandoned." Against this background, their case needs to
be compelling indeed. A preponderance of the evidence should not
suffice.
Second, the evolutionary model of cultural learning I have
described in this essay itself justifies judicial review. Case law, I
have argued, evolves. This is possible in significant part because
courts generally follow precedent. The requirement that courts
adhere to precedent serves to preserve the cultural learning embodied
in that precedent. As we learn more about rule of law, equality,
liberty, and other fundamental values, our case law comes to reflect
that learning. Legislatures have no comparable mechanism. As a
result, it is easier for legislatures to discard cultural learning in the
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heat of the moment. Decision making by popularly-elected
representatives is viewed as legitimate, and therefore serves to
minimize potential intra-group conflict. But because it lacks any
mechanism for the systematic preservation of cultural learning, it can
sometimes produce rules seriously at odds with such learning.
Judicial review corrects this problem, at least with respect to our
most fundamental values. One of the functions of judicial review, in
other words, may be to preserve cultural learning with respect to
fundamental principles and thereby permit their continued evolution.
But if this is so, originalist judicial review is inherently implaus-
ible. Unconstrained democratic decision making and originalist
interpretation share a common flaw: they both permit abandonment
of intervening learning. Both are therefore maladaptive. Using the
one to correct the other is likely to prove futile at best, counter-
productive at worst.
IV. CONCLUSION
The perspective this essay brings to bear on the problem of
originalist interpretation is relatively unusual and has not been tested
in the rough and tumble of academic debate. I anticipate that at least
some of my arguments will require refinement, perhaps even
retraction. Until rebuttal is made, however, evolutionary analysis
leaves me profoundly skeptical of originalist claims. To hold up
Islamic traditionalism as a methodological model for U.S. statutory
or constitutional interpretation strikes me as bizarre. And yet that,
ultimately, is what originalists are doing.
We have learned, we will learn, we should learn. No one has yet
persuaded me to the contrary.
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